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Collective Agency and Resistance to Imposed Development in Rural South Africa1
Jacques P de Wet2
ABSTRACT 
Mbizana, in Pondoland, along South Africa’s Wild Coast, is at the centre of a struggle 
between local residents, a multi-national mining company and the South African 
Government. In 2007 the local residents formed the AmaDiba Crisis Committee (ACC) in 
opposition to a government-supported proposal by Mineral Commodities Ltd, an 
Australian company, to mine their communal land. According to the ACC, the mining 
company and the government had violated established democratic processes and 
undermined the local villagers’ control over their communal land. In 2008, a mining
licence was granted by Government, however, in 2011, after protests and petitions by the 
ACC to Government, the Minister of Mineral Resources revoked the licence. The mining 
company’s response was to submit a new application for prospecting rights. In public
demonstrations against the mining of their land, the protesters have made reference to the 
well-known Mpondo Revolt3 of 1959-1960; and, in interviews they have also mentioned
resistance to the Mbizana sugar project in 1985-86 and the Gum Tree Rebellion in 1999. 
These references locate their struggle to retain the right to decide how best to develop 
their land in a history of resistance that started in the era of Apartheid, and has continued 
under the new democratic dispensation. At the heart of the activism is a collective 
consciousness that is best conceptualised as collective agency. This paper focuses on 
current resistance to imposed development, and its connections to past resistance, 
especially the Mpondo Revolt of 50 years ago. I argue that, contrary to popular 
perception, rural people of Pondoland have a long history of resisting imposed 
development and actively participating in their own development.   
Key words: Pondoland, imposed development, resistance, collective agency, Mpondo 
Revolt. 
1
 Some sections in this paper form part of a chapter in Kepe and Ntsebeza (eds.) (2011) Rural 
Resistance in South Africa: The Mpondo Revolts after Fifty Years, Leiden: Koninklijke Brill NV. 
2 The author lectures in the Department Sociology‟s Development Studies Programme at the
University of Cape Town, South Africa (email: jacques.dewet@uct.ac.za). 
3
 Mpondo Revolt is sometimes spelt Pondo Revolt. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
“Asilufuni Uphuhliso lwenu! [We don‟t want your development!] […] If this 
mining takes place and the government issues a licence in this area, there will be 
war. There will be an uprising as it was in the [last] Mpondo Revolt.” (Nonhle 
Mbuthuma, Executive member of the AmaDiba Crisis Committee, 2009)  
 
“I‟d rather die than allow this land to be mined!” 
(Tat‟ uSamson Gampe, resident of AmaDiba in the district of Mbizana, 2009)  
 
Nonhle Mbuthuma (in her 30s) and Tat‟ uSamson Gampe (in his 80s) were two of almost a 
thousand people from Mbizana in North Eastern Pondoland, and others from further afield, 
who took part in a protest march on 20 July 2008. The protesters were expressing their 
opposition to a government-supported proposal by Mineral Commodities Ltd, an 
Australian company, to mine their communal land (SABC TV2 50/50, 2008a). The mining 
venture, Xolobeni Mineral Sands, proposes to strip away indigenous vegetation, in order to 
mine valuable titanium deposits along a 22 km stretch of coastline in the district of 
Mbizana, south of Port Edward. Local residents, who oppose this form of development, 
constitute the AmaDiba Crisis Committee (ACC). They argue that the proposed mining 
enterprise deprives them of control over their own land and destroys their livelihood 
strategies. Both Nonhle and Tat‟ uSamson are members of the ACC, which has charged the 
Australian mining company and its local black empowerment partner, Xolobeni 
Empowerment Company, with human rights violations. The ACC has taken its complaints 
to the South African Human Rights Commission and petitioned the South African 
Government. 
 
Protests and resistance to impositions in the name of development are not new to the 
Mpondo people of the Mbizana area. Young and old know their history. Today‟s young 
activists like Nonhle refer to the Mpondo Revolt of 1959-19604 in their public speeches, 
and there are veterans of that revolt, like Tat‟ uSamson, who oppose the mining venture. In 
interviews they also mentioned resistance to the Mbizana sugar project in 1985-86 and the 
Gum Tree Rebellion in 1999. These references locate their struggle to retain the right to 
                                                 
4
 The Mpondo Revolt of 1959-1960 was a peasant uprising in Pondoland, which was violently suppressed by 
the Apartheid armed forces. The uprising took place in the context of years of smaller acts of deviance and 
resistance throughout the 1950s to the Apartheid government‟s Bantu Authorities and Betterment Programme 
(for more details see „Fifty Years of Resistance to Imposed Development‟ below).   
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decide how best to develop their land, in a history of resistance that started in the era of 
Apartheid, and has continued in the new democratic South Africa. 
 
In this paper I focus on the Mpondo Revolt of 1959-1960 and the current resistance to the 
Xolobeni mining venture in the Mbizana district. I argue that resistance to the mining 
venture is linked to a history of collective agency and resistance to imposed development. 
Fifty years after the last of the Mpondo revolts, which ended in 1960, ordinary people of 
Mbizana continue to exercise their collective agency in defence of participatory decision-
making as essential to people-centred development, and their right to shape their own lives. 
The paper unfolds by paying attention to:    The concept of collective agency  A history of collective agency and resistance to imposed development going back to 
the Mpondo Revolt with references also to the Gum Tree Rebellion and opposition to 
Mbizana sugar project  A description of the Xolobeni Mineral Sands Project as the most recent example of an 
attempt to impose development on the people of Mbizana  The ACC‟s case against the mining company‟s proposed development and a discussion 
of the ways in which ACC has demonstrated collective agency in their resistance to the 
mining development  And, finally, a comparison of the current resistance to imposed development and the 
Mpondo Revolt in order to highlight the similarities and to draw attention to rural 
people‟s long history of collective agency in the context of development.  
 
2. COLLECTIVE AGENCY 
At the heart of the Mbizana protesters‟ activism is a collective consciousness that is best 
described as collective agency.  
 
By agency I mean that people are active participants in their development, because they 
take responsibility for their own well-being. Social systems and structures influence human 
behaviour by imposing constraints as well as providing enabling resources and 
opportunities, for individual and collective development. However, Bandura (2001: 15) 
observes that „human agents operate generatively and proactively, not just reactively, to 
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shape the character of their social systems‟. I acknowledge that people are producers as 
well as products of social systems, but in this paper I emphasise the former more than the 
latter.  
 
The concept of agency is central to Sen‟s (2001) understanding of development as 
freedom. For Sen, development must be characterised by participants having the 
opportunity to reflect on what they consider valuable, and by actively shaping their own 
lives (ibid.). Collective agency refers to situations in which a group of people combine 
their knowledge and expertise in order to achieve a shared goal (Bandura, 2001: 14). This 
is not merely pooling of the goals of individuals, rather it is the manifestation of the goals 
that everyone in the group has agreed to (Schmid, 2005: 58-9). Group members are willing 
to defend their right to shape their lives in accordance with values and goals that have 
made a joint commitment to, after reasoned collective reflection (Sen, 2001). The „key 
ingredient‟ of collective agency, according to Bandura (2001: 14), is „people‟s shared 
belief in their collective power to produce [a] desired result‟ in their social system.  
 
In the context of people-centred development collective action becomes „an engine‟ for the 
collective capabilities of the poor (Ibrahim, 2006). According to Ibrahim (2006: 408) a 
number of factors promote collective capabilities. These include the existence of formal 
and informal institutions, which provide a framework for human interaction, and social 
capital, „the lubricant which allows the poor to reach collective decisions, reinforces trust 
and allows for the exchange of ideas and coordination‟ (ibid.). The mobilisation of social 
capital „enhances [the] bargaining power of the poor‟, catalyses participation, and protects 
poor communities from shocks which can threaten their livelihood strategies (Lin, 2001 in 
Ibrahim, 2006: 408).  
  
Bandura (2001: 16, 18) singles out two main factors that undermine collective agency.   
The first is factional conflict, and the second „global market forces unfettered by social 
obligation‟. Development, whether at national or local municipal ward levels, requires that 
individuals merge self-interest in support of common core values and goals. These features 
of collective agency are not easily achieved in a society characterised by social 
fragmentation and conflicting interests. Similarly, where there is no social obligation to 
local communities, global economic forces erode social bonds and communal commitment 
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to local causes (ibid.: 16). My research shows that the people of Mbizana are not exempt 
from either; however, I have found that the impact on local village communities, of global 
economic forces is more complicated than Bandura‟s (ibid.) attribution of negative effects.  
Global economic forces can also galvanise local people against what they perceive to be a 
common external enemy, thereby strengthening social bonds and collective agency.  
 
Along with Bandura (2001), Ibrahim (2006) and Sen (2001), I argue that collective agency 
is fundamental if development is to be sustainable; sustainability requires that the poor be 
treated as fully human, active subjects of history, not passive objects to be manipulated by 
oppressive social structures. 
 
I now provide a brief history of resistance to imposed development in Mbizana, before I 
discuss the current resistance to mining as an example of collective agency being sustained 
across generations in one district.  
 
3.  FIFTY YEARS OF RESISTANCE TO IMPOSED DEVELOPMENT IN 
MBIZANA 
Mbizana was a centre of resistance against the Apartheid government‟s Bantu Authorities 
and Betterment Programme in the 1950s. In Pondoland acts of defiance and rebellion led 
up to the well documented Mpondo Revolt of 1959-1960 (Kepe and Ntsebeza, 2011). The 
AmaDiba area in the Mbizana district features in this history of the Mpondo uprising. This 
is borne out in the „Departmental Commission of Inquiry into the Unrest in Eastern 
Pondoland during 1960‟ (Van Heerden, 1960). Sgt. E.M. Warren, the Bantu Affairs 
Commissioner of Mbizana, wrote that the AmaDiba location, under the leadership of 
Theophilus Tshangela, had gone over to the rebels (see Van Heerden, 1960, Annexure C). 
Tshangela was the local chief‟s counsellor, but „began to move away from chief Gangatha 
in the late 1950s as the state started to put pressure on the chiefs to support their rural 
programme‟ (Beinart, 1984: 106). According to Beinart, Tshangela subsequently became 
one of the most important leaders in the Mpondo Revolt of 1959-1960 (Beinart, 1984). 
 
Wood (1993:30-1) says,  
“Ostensibly, the [Mpondo] rebellion was triggered in reaction to the introduction 
of the Bantu Authorities system [by the Apartheid government]. In practice, the 
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causes were far more complex […] However, the greatest trigger of discontent 
seems to have been land reclamation programmes” (which is Betterment by 
another name).   
„Betterment proposals involved the concentration of scattered settlements, the demarcation 
and fencing of arable areas, and the division of grazing areas into fenced camps‟ (Beinart 
and Bundy, 1980: 298). Government officials considered a reduction in numbers of 
livestock on the land to be a pre-requite. Betterment may have been presented as nature 
conservation but this did not take into account the relationship between Betterment and the 
imposition of Bantu Authorities in 1951, nor of the central role that this nexus played in 
the events of 1959-1960. Under the National Party government the Betterment schemes 
turned into state mechanisms to keep the rural poor at a bare subsistence level and to 
maintain migratory labour. At this point Betterment thinking had changed from an 
emphasis on land „rehabilitation‟ to ad hoc stabilisation: „the state priority was not 
“betterment” of the area, but the disorganization of African protest, the reduction of their 
wage levels and prohibition on urbanization‟ (Hendricks, 1989: 319).  
“Stabilization was the solution to the rural objectives of the state. Acting in the 
guise of a state development programme, it was, in fact, a scheme designed to 
prepare the [black] reserves ideologically, administratively and in terms of 
infrastructure for the resettlement of Africans from „black spots‟, white farms and 
the towns”. (ibid.) 
On this basis, Yawitch (1981: 31) argues, Betterment became less about providing a pool 
of migrant labourers, and sustaining their dependents, and more about social control. This 
logic found concrete expression in the Apartheid government‟s Bantustan policy, where 
„autonomous governments‟ would manage black Africans considered redundant to South 
Africa. McAllister (1992: 209) links Betterment to the loss of decision-making power and 
social control. He says:  
“Coinciding with this were the loss of autonomy and control by local 
communities over important areas of their existence, and the imposition of 
centralized, state control in its place … With Betterment, the control of land, and 
other related issues, was taken away from local communities and exercised by the 
state in conjunction with the Tribal Authority. The power of the state and Tribal 
Authority (with a headman or chief as its head) was thus increased dramatically 
at the expense of local autonomy and democratic process.” [my emphasis]  
Hendricks and Peires (2011: 133) note that many „locations‟ in the Mbizana magisterial 
district were declared Betterment Areas by the Apartheid government. The people of 
Mbizana and the Eastern Pondoland were determined to resist the imposition of Betterment 
and Bantu Authorities and to defend their right to shape their lives based on what they 
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valued and had decided collectively. Initially the methods of protest were traditional ones, 
ranging from non-compliance to mass meetings, marches, boycotting traders, deputations 
to magistrates, but an unsympathetic state deepened the crisis, and the protesters turned on 
collaborating chiefs and headmen, and burnt their compounds (Turok, 1961: 13). Later 
government dipping tanks were destroyed and a government tent associated with the 
Betterment schemes was also burned (Wood, 1993: 31). On the 6th June 1960 thousands of 
the people from Eastern Pondoland met on Ngquza Hill, near Mbizana (ibid.: 27). It was a 
peaceful gathering, but it met with a violent response from the state (ibid.). Eleven 
protesters were killed, 23 others were arrested. In the following year 30 people were 
sentenced to death for their part in the Mpondo Revolt (ibid.: 27-8). By January 1961 
resistance had been suppressed (ibid.: 30). 
 
Since the end of the last of the Mpondo revolts in 1960, now just over fifty years ago, the 
Mpondo people of the AmaDiba area in Mbizana have, for similar reasons, continued to 
resist imposed development of their communal land. Tat‟ uSamson (in an interview in 
2009) recalled that between the 1960 Mpondo Revolt and the current protests against the 
mining venture, there have been numerous instances of resistance to imposed development 
in Mbizana. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, for example, there was opposition to the 
government-sponsored Mbizana sugar cane plantation project, and in the late 1990s there 
was the Gum Tree Rebellion. In a study of the Mbizana sugar project, which was 
undertaken in 1985-1986 by the Institute for Management and Development Studies 
(IMDS), the IMDS reported that local people were „antagonistic‟ towards so-called 
development projects, which they perceived benefitted only a few members of the local 
village community (IMDS, 1986: 7, 28). It had led to forced removals, the loss of land, and 
it undermined their livelihood strategies (ibid.). Tat‟ uSamson explained that in the case of 
the Gum Tree Rebellion of 1999 there were two weeks of violence in the AmaDiba area. 
The South African government facilitated the gum tree planting project. Under a rental 
system the villagers were supposed to be paid to plant more trees. The intervention divided 
the village community: some wanted trees and „development‟, while others questioned this 
land use and preferred to keep it for growing crops and for grazing livestock (Schutz, 
2007). In the end, the fourteen homesteads that had planted gum trees for South African 
Pulp and Paper Industries Ltd (SAPPI) were burnt to the ground. Schutz (ibid.) argues that 
the ensuing conflict was caused by SAPPI and the state (both whom were regarded as 
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outsiders by the community) „ignoring local concerns, pushing their own agenda and 
sowing division‟. 
 
My examination of local resistance to these development projects has revealed that in each 
case: i.) Outsiders (either the government or the government and the business sector) had 
attempted to impose development on the community, ii.) There had been little or no 
consultation with the local people, iii.) The local community‟s control over communal land 
and their livelihood strategies were undermined by the development project, and iv.) 
Ordinary people from the Mbizana district put up strong resistance. (Resistance is 
understood to mean publicly demonstrated opposition.) Similar patterns have emerged in 
the current opposition to the Xolobeni Mineral Sands Project.  
 
I now turn to a description of the Xolobeni Mineral Sands Project, the target of current 
resistance.  
 
4. XOLOBENI MINERAL SANDS PROJECT  
The Xolobeni Mineral Sands Project, a mining venture in the AmaDiba area along the 
Pondoland Wild Coast, has been proposed by an Australian company, Mineral Resources 
Commodities (MRC), its South African subsidiary, Transworld Energy and Mineral 
Resources (TEM), and, a small black economic empowerment (BEE) venture, Xolobeni 
Community Empowerment Company (Xolco). They plan to strip away indigenous 
vegetation on communal land, along a 22 kilometre stretch of coastline in the Mbizana 
district, in order to mine for titanium-bearing minerals. Over a period of 22 years it is 
expected that 13 million tons of minerals would be mined each year (Barradas, 2008). The 
mining company has applied for a licence to mine in Xolobeni in the AmaDiba area. 
Xolobeni has the 10th largest deposit of titanium in the world, worth an estimated R11 
billion5 (Hofstatter, 2008a). Titanium is used in the manufacture of aircraft engines and 
other products such as paint.  
 
The mining operation will require the building of the following infrastructure: access 
roads, water supply and pipelines, a wet separation plant, a dry minerals separation plant, 
                                                 
5
  R11 billion ZAR equals €834,900,000 (based on an exchange rate of R1 equals €0.0759 as at 7 
August 2013). 
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and storage facilities (Barradas, 2008).  The National Department of Minerals and Energy 
(DME) initially supported the mining venture mainly because it promised to create job 
opportunities6 in the area (Khuswayo, 2008). The latter is one of the objectives of the 
national government‟s foreign investment-led, growth-orientated development policy 
(ibid.).   It, therefore, makes sense for the DME to support the mining venture because 
there is high demand for titanium, and it fits the government‟s economic development 
policy. In May 2005 the Eastern Cape Department of Minerals and Energy Affairs granted 
TEM provisional prospecting rights, and in July 2008, the DME awarded TEM limited 
mining rights to a third of the area requested in the original application, which was to have 
been signed and issued on 31 October 2008 (Legal Resources Centre, 2008; Khuswayo, 
2008).  Despite a warning from the Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism that 
mining would permanently damage local ecosystems in an area acknowledged as one of 
the most important centres of plant diversity in South Africa, and an internationally 
recognised centre of endemism, the DME initially granted the mining rights (Clarke, 2008; 
Hofstatter, 2008a; Naidoo, 2003).   
 
In 2007 local residents established the ACC in order to oppose the mining venture, and to 
promote the existing community-based eco-tourism business, which runs along the same 
22 kilometres. The ACC‟s resistance is informed by four interlinked issues: the lack of 
consultation about development strategies, violation of communal land rights, threats to 
livelihood strategies, and the lack of legitimacy of those who ostensibly represent the 
community.   
 
5. ACC’S CASE AGAINST THE MINING PROJECT  
Inadequate consultation and the violation of communal land rights 
We just saw this mining thing happening without the people being properly 
consulted. I will never agree to something that the community has not agreed to. 
(AmaDiba resident7, 2009)  
In 2007 the South African Human Rights Commission (HRC) sent a fact finding mission to 
Mbizana to investigate the AmaDiba residents‟ complaint that the legally required public 
                                                 
6
 In the official application mention is made of 347 permanent jobs, but no details are provided.  
7
 The author conducted all the interviews with residents from the AmaDiba area in isiMpondo (an 
isiXhosa dialect). The quotes are English translations. 
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participation process was flawed, which  was also a denial of the rights of freedom of 
expression and  information (Hofstatter, 2008a: 56; Marshal, 2007; Myrtle, 2007b; South 
African Human Rights Commission, 2007: 2). 
 
The HRC (2007: 2) report noted that the law required that the communal land users 
consent to other parties using their land. Because the AmaDiba village community is 
co-owner of the land with the State8, in whose name the land is registered (Schultz, 
2007), the community must be consulted. The mining company did not get a 
Community Resolution from the Department of Land Affairs and the traditional 
authorities representing the community (Legal Resources Centre, 2008). The HRC‟s 
(2007: 8-9) report concluded that, „despite a chronic lack of information, the majority 
of the communities [affected by the mining] are not in favour of mining while the 
mining companies consistently claim otherwise, saying that support is unanimous‟. 
 
At  a  meeting in August 2007, the Queen of Pondoland9 rejected the claim by Minerals 
Commodities Ltd that the AmaDiba village community „continues to unanimously support 
the project and has formed a consultative forum supported by the traditional leaders, [the] 
King and Queen of Pondoland, as well as local government authorities‟ (Kockott, 2007) 
The King had warned that forcing the mining development on the AmaDiba people would 
be viewed as „nothing less than invasion‟ of their land (Legalbrief Environmental, 2008).  
 
In September 2008 the then Minister of DME, Buyelwa Sonjica, acknowledged that there 
was substantial opposition to the Xolobeni Mineral Sands Project, and admitted, for the 
first time, that the consultation process was „flawed‟ (Daily Dispatch, 2008; Kockott, 
2008b).   
 
Mining undermines livelihood strategies  
The ACC argued that the scoping and environmental impact assessment reports did not 
properly assess the impact that the venture would have, in the short and the long term, on 
the livelihoods of many local people, viz. farming, fishing, gathering from the veld or 
                                                 
8
 The Department of Land Affairs holds communal land in trust for communities.  
9
 The King and Queen of Pondoland are the head of the AmaMpondo royal family and the most 
senior traditional and cultural leaders of the AmaMpondo people of South Africa.  
  
11 
 
working in eco-tourism. As an example, many of the residents‟ food gardens lie right next 
to the mining area and some residents will be cut off from parts of their grazing lands 
(Carte Blanche, 2008).  
“The mining will affect the community here because the development will pass 
through some homesteads. It will also interfere with grazing areas. People feel 
threatened.” (Tat‟ uSamson Gampe, 2009)   
Some people would be forced to seek agricultural land elsewhere, which would also 
require that ancestral graves be moved.  
“The area affected by mining is from Mzamba River to Mtentu River. We were 
informed that we would have to move to a site nearby, where we will have to 
build new homesteads. […] Our forefathers‟ grave sites are all here; we are not 
prepared to dig them up.” (Tat‟ uSamson Gampe, 2009)   
Tourism, and community-based eco-tourism in particular, would be affected negatively by 
mining. The staff of a local community-based eco-tourism initiative, the award winning 
AmaDiba Adventures Horse and Hiking Trail, felt that eco-tourism could provide a good 
income base that would also support other livelihood activities, such as crop cultivation 
and rearing livestock, which are important to local people (Ntshona and Lahiff, 2003: 15-
16). The pro-mining group used the argument, that „concern for the environment‟ puts 
„conservation‟ ahead of „people‟, in order to discredit local community activists (for 
example see Hofstatter, 2008b: 42). However, the promise of jobs does not equate to a 
livelihood strategy, as some economists have argued. Families are likely to become more 
dependent on wages (which are obviously attractive to cash poor residents) and less able to 
rely on the diverse natural resources than at present.   
 
Farming would be badly affected by damage to the environment caused by dust, water 
shortages and pollution, and landfill would spread beyond the area being mined (Schutz, 
2007b). The noise would scare the livestock, and locals would be disturbed by 40 ton ore 
trucks passing by, every hour, every day, for 22 years (Hofstätter, 2008b:42). The mining 
operation would create a strip of desert on what is now pristine coastal endemism. 
 
The DEAT‟s EIA argued that the mine would have significant ecological and 
environmental consequences.  Furthermore, a European Union study found that eco-
tourism in the area „beats mining hands-down in terms of sustainable economic delivery to 
the community‟ (SABC TV2 50/50, 2008a).  Normally, all environmental impact 
assessments (EIAs) are approved by the DEAT. In this case the South African government 
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deemed that the DME had the necessary expertise to assess the environmental impact of 
the mining operation and provide approval (Kockott, 2008a; Naidoo, 2003). DME chose to 
ignore the results of DEAT‟s environmental impact assessment. The conflicting positions 
adopted by these two departments represent a fundamental clash of development 
perspectives within the government. 
 
Illegitimacy of Xolobeni Community Empowerment Company as a Representative of 
Local Interests 
Very little is known about Xolco, the BEE Company, which is said to hold a 26 per cent 
stake in TEM (Carnie, 2008b), the South African subsidiary of Mineral Resources 
Commodities, and which claimed it represented the affected village communities because 
it manages a number of local trusts. 
 
Hofstatter (2008b: 43) writes that Xolco side-lined legitimate community structures such 
as the traditional village councils. The local community was not invited to take part in 
trustee elections, nor was it involved in Xolco appointments (ibid.: 44). Scorpion Dimane, 
a local shopkeeper, anti-mining activist, and an outspoken member of the AmaDiba 
community had this to say:  
“How can a structure like Xolco that has been formed outside the tribal authority 
represent our community? […] You can‟t just form a private company to benefit 
from taking things from the land that doesn‟t even belong to you.” (Kockott and 
Gobingca, 2007) 
Dimane had questioned Xolco‟s integrity at a community meeting organised by Xolco 
representatives (Hofstatter, 2007)  
“It is written in a document that all of you here have elected Xolco. It is said in 
the document each and every household in the community has a share in Xolco, 
in this mining. But that is not formally recorded anywhere [...] They are lying.” 
(SABC TV 50/50, 2008a).  
A year later Scorpion Dimane died under very suspicious circumstances (Carte Blanche, 
2008). 
   
Xolco‟s lack of transparency, in part, prompted the ACC to lodge an application against it 
with the HRC. The ACC argued that the residents of AmaDiba were not given a chance to 
examine Xolco‟s books (ibid.). Furthermore, the Company (MRC) refused to disclose the 
financial details of a deal struck between Xolco and themselves (Hofstatter, 2008a: 58; 
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Hofstatter, 2008b: 43). There was no evidence of a legally binding agreement which would 
oblige Xolco to cede shares, or any revenues to the trusts; or that the trustees have the right 
to appoint the directors of Xolco and its operating company (ibid.).  Kockott and Gobingca 
(2007) concluded that „the people who [are] directly affected by the mining proposals have 
no legal share in the planned mining operation‟. 
 
In December 2007 the mining company bussed local people and some traditional leaders to 
Pretoria to deliver a pro-mining petition to Buyelwa Sonjica, the then Minerals and Energy 
minister. Chief Lunga Baleni, the traditional leader of five of the designated mining areas, 
is convinced that the mining petition was fraudulent (Hofstatter, 2008b: 45).  Sarah 
Sephton from  the Legal Resource Centre in Grahamstown was told that the 
“[…] majority of the supporters were from an inland group and not from the 
community who‟ll directly be affected by the mining. …People have been told 
that they are signing up for electricity, when in fact they were signing up for a 
petition in favour of the mine.” (Carte Blanche, 2008)  
There is also some evidence to suggest that Xolco‟s members themselves were either left 
in the dark or were misled by the mother company. Zeka Mnyamana, the Xolco secretary 
and spokesman, claimed that  
“[…] what we need is the truth … We welcome what the AmaDiba Crisis 
Committee is saying. They are asking questions about the mining, which we can‟t 
answer. We need to have those answers before people can decide whether the 
mining should go ahead or not.” (Kockott and Gobingca, 2007) 
Then there is the tarnished record of ACCODA, the Amadiba Coastal Communities 
Development Association. Zamile Qunya was chairperson of ACCODA in March 2007. 
As far back as 2004 he had openly championed the mining venture. Together with a Port 
Elizabeth-based attorney, Max Boqwana (one of the original BEE partners) he set up the 
Xolobeni Community Empowerment Company (Pty) Ltd (Xolco) (ibid.). 
 
ACCODA, which controlled the Amadiba Adventures Horse and Hiking Trail, the major 
eco-tourism alternative to mining (Ntshona and Lahiff, 2003; Schutz, 2007b), 
“[…] had been on the verge of signing a “lucrative contract” with Wilderness 
Safaris in a partnership that would have injected money and professionalism into 
[the local] eco-tourism initiatives […] when Zamile Qunya, then chairperson of 
ACCODA, rejected it at the last minute.” (ibid.) 
Qunya then changed the composition of ACCODA so that 11 of the 12 members supported 
the mining venture (ibid.).  
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In a 2006 documentary produced by the South African Broadcasting Company‟s 
environmental TV programme 50/50, accusations, which included bribery, corruption and 
even murder10, were levelled at ACCODA. ACCODA‟s accountants had found evidence of 
gross mismanagement and lack of accountability on the part of its committee members 
(50/50 TV, 2006). Soon after the documentary was completed the Amadiba Trail 
Adventures headquarters mysteriously burnt down.   
 
Xolco and Xolobeni Minerals Sands seem to have had strong backing from local 
councillors and Zoleka Capa, the Mayor of the OR Tambo Municipality, (Hofstatter, 
2008a). In an interview with the South African pay channel TV programme Carte Blanche 
Mayor Capa demonstrated her support for the mining when she said:   
“Let the process go. Why would you want to stop it? […] The people [Zamile 
Qunya and others] that were with the tourism are now with the mining and they 
are the people now who are saying, “No man, change your mind. We have 
changed ours”. (Carte Blanche, 2008) 
As with Betterment and Bantu Authorities, it seems that much of the present day unrest in 
the AmaDiba area of Mbizana is the consequence of threats to local villagers‟ livelihood 
strategies, and the failure to consult local people through the local power structures, as the 
law required. My research shows that the opportunities for self-enrichment and power have 
led to the splintering of opinion, rumour mongering and conflict refracted through local 
elites, who themselves are often as much in the dark as their ostensible „constituencies‟. 
Some local elites have been co-opted into supporting the mining interests and, they have in 
turn, tried to co-opt others, including certain municipal officials.   
 
6. ONGOING COLLECTIVE AGENCY AND RESISTANCE TO IMPOSED 
DEVELOPMENT 
From its inception the proposed mining venture has come under heavy criticism. 
Resistance has taken the form of mass meetings, legal submissions (the HRC submission, 
in particular), media publicity, marches and demonstrations. For example, on 20 July 2008 
a protest march along the coast, through the areas affected by the mining, received 
considerable media attention (Carnie, 2008a). More recently there has been the threat of 
violence.  
                                                 
10
 The 2003 murder of a headman, Madoda Ndovela, has been ascribed to his opposition to mining 
(Hofstatter, 2007). 
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At the forefront of resistance is the ACC, with almost 3000 members who reside in the 
AmaDiba area (email correspondence with the leadership of the AmaDiba Crisis 
Committee 16 November 2009). While ACC‟s raison d'être is to oppose the imposition of 
the mining development, the Committee‟s activities are informed by an understanding of 
development that is endogenous: 
“Real development must go together with that which ordinary people say they 
want. There is a saying in the Mpondo language: Development starts at the feet 
and progresses upwards, it does not start at the head and move downwards. It‟s 
bottom-up… if the government was to come with something from the head in a 
manner that stifles us, [we would say:] „No, this is not development‟.” (Interview 
with the leadership of the ACC, 2009) 
The ACC may not be very clear about what development outcomes they wish to achieve, 
but they have articulated an approach based on participatory decision-making. For them 
„real development‟ is founded on processes that create opportunities that enable ordinary 
rural people to influence development decisions that affect their lives. They have resisted 
attempts by outsiders, including government officials, to impose any development 
initiative that has not started „at the feet‟. They are prepared to defend their right to shape 
their lives according to what, they as a group, have decided after collective and reasoned 
reflection, an approach in accord with Sen‟s perspective on development.  
 
The ACC has been able to garner considerable media attention, not only because they 
occupy the moral high-ground, but also because the possible destruction of the natural 
beauty of the area, obviously attracts much attention.  Environmental organisations, such 
as Sustaining the Wild Coast and the Wilderness Foundation, and their myriad of network 
partners, have used the internet and television to wage an information war. Such 
technological linkages have harnessed the support of concerned urban residents, nature-
loving tourists and activists from other parts of the country and the world. Some of this has 
translated into help, in terms of volunteerism and expertise, as well as support for the 
affected communities (Nonhle Mbuthuma, 2009). The ACC and residents have mobilised 
social capital beyond the confines of the local villages, thereby enhancing their bargaining 
power in their dealings with the government.  
 
In 2007 the AmaDiba residents sent several petitions to National Government, demanding 
that the DME reject the mining company‟s application, because they feared they would 
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lose rights to their ancestral land and become squatters on a mine dump (Hofstatter, 2008a: 
56; Hofstatter, 2008b: 43). They also sent petitions to the Eastern Cape Provincial 
Department of Economic Affairs and Tourism. 
“Many of us are employed in the tourism sector, and are therefore affected by the 
development. The most sustainable and preferable way to develop the area is with 
tourism [and] nature conservation that also employs local communities working 
in the tourism sector, and sustainable farming. [...] We would not support any 
venture, which would lead to the displacement of people from their land....We 
would also like to see the fostering of sustainable development which is owned 
by the communities, and directly benefits the rural communities, and honours 
their rights to natural resources.” (Sustaining the Wild Coast, 2007a) 
 At a meeting on 18 June 2007, when about 150 local residents gathered at the Xolobeni 
Traditional Authority, two municipal ward councillors and representatives of Xolco were 
severely criticised by residents and members of the ACC (Schultz, 2007; Sustaining the 
Wild Coast, 2007b). Nonhle Mbuthuma voiced the concerns of many, „We can no longer 
trust our ward councillors to speak on our behalf; and the Xolco directors were never 
elected or mandated by us to negotiate on mining‟ (Sustaining the Wild Coast, 2007b).  
 
In August 2008, despite the ACC‟s petitions, public protests and the Human Rights 
Commission investigation, the DME informed the mining company that it had been 
granted the mining rights to a third of the area which had been requested in the original 
application (Barradas, 2008). The announcement, at a community meeting in the AmaDiba 
area, that the mining would go ahead, was met with further demonstrations from the ACC 
(Kockott, 2008b). 
“It [the mining venture] just arrived, confusing and with many stories. It did 
come to the people. We showed our discontent with it to the government, but our 
objections were not considered. These people just said they would go on with the 
mine despite our objections that the people did not want it.” (AmaDiba 
Community member, 2009)  
It became apparent to the Minister that there was substantial opposition to dune mining, 
and conflict was growing, she met with protesters and members of the affected 
communities (Van der Merwe, 2008).  These meetings took place amidst growing conflict. 
A pro-mining headman was beaten up and consultants, which the mining company had 
appointed to broker offers of compensation to the families who would lose their homes and 
land to make way for the mining development, were chased out of the area (Kockott, 
2008b).   
  
17 
 
“The whole situation has the potential for violence and there were already 
rumblings in the community. There were some who had pointed out that in the 
Mpondo Uprisings of the 1960s some chiefs had been killed because they were 
perceived to be giving outsiders land that belonged to the people.” (Myrtle, 
2007b) 
The mining licence was to have been signed into effect on 31 October 2008, but on 2 
September the Minister said she would not sign the licence. This was a consequence of a 
lawyer from the Legal Resources Centre, acting on behalf of the AmaDiba Crisis 
Committee, filing a notice of appeal which requested that the Minister of Minerals and 
Energy suspend the licence and withdraw the mining rights (Van der Merwe, 2008 & 
Legal Resources Centre, 2008). The ACC appeal argued that the mining rights had been 
granted “without sufficient and reasonable notice to, consultation with [,] or invitation for 
comments from the community, as an interested and affected party[,] which was unlawful” 
(Legal Resources Centre, 2008). A ministerial spokesperson indicated that the appeal 
process would now have to run its course (Daily Dispatch, 2008). When no decision was 
forthcoming the ACC lodged a complaint against the Minister with the Public Protector11.   
  
Three years later, in June 2011, the new Minister of Mineral Resources12 withdrew the 
mining licence granted in 2008 (Macleod, 2011). In response, the mining company 
submitted a new application for prospecting rights (Macleod, 2012:16). 
 
The response from the current national government contrasts dramatically with the 
Apartheid government‟s extremely violent suppression of resistance to Betterment and the 
Bantu Authorities. The then government viewed the Mpondo Revolt of 1959-1960 as part 
of the struggle for liberation led by the African National Congress (Wood, 1993:31).  
 
7. LINKING PRESENT RESISTANCE TO PAST RESISTANCE 
For the people of Mbizana the history of imposed development and resistance did not end 
in 1960 with the last of the Mpondo revolts, it is still a feature of their lives. This paper 
focuses on the current resistance and its connections to the Mpondo revolts as examples of 
ongoing collective agency in Mbizana. While there are some obvious differences, for 
example, current resistance is distinguished by the prominence of women and the very 
                                                 
11
 The ACC later withdrew its complaint, when in June 2011 the minister withdrew the mining 
licence.  
12
 The old Department of Minerals and Energy was split into two departments.  
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different response of the democratically elected government, a number of similarities13 
emerge when the two are compared. These similarities, which run across several 
generations of community members, shed light on the links between collective agency, 
resistance and development. These similarities include: 
  
i.) Resistance to development ventures imposed by outsiders.  During the Mpondo 
revolts local people resisted the government‟s imposition of Betterment. The ACC 
has resisted the dune mining venture imposed by an Australian mining company, 
which had the blessing of the national Department of Minerals and Energy.  
ii.) The illegitimacy of those claiming to represent the people affected by the 
development. With few exceptions, the traditional leaders supported Betterment 
and the Bantu Authorities, and the Mpondo resisters targeted them for collaborating 
with the enemy, the Apartheid government. Similarly, the protesters from AmaDiba 
have identified Xolco, certain members of the local authority, and some traditional 
leaders, as collaborators for promoting the mining venture. Today far fewer 
traditional leaders are prepared to ignore the bulk of local residents who are 
opposed to the mining development; however, local government officials seem to 
be pursuing an undemocratic role like that that played by the Bantu Authorities, but 
for different reasons.  
iii.) Inadequate consultation. Though some traditional leaders might have been 
consulted when the Apartheid government tried to enforce Betterment (and 
establish Bantu Authorities) in Pondoland, the people at grassroots never were, and 
they objected vehemently. The failure to consult ordinary rural people seems to 
have been a significant departure from forms of participatory decision-making that 
were common practice in these rural communities (McAllister, 1989: 355). A main 
complaint in the ACC‟s submissions to the HRC, and to the Minister of Minerals 
and Energy, is the lack of consultation, this time by the mining company and the 
government. Participatory development is obviously not new to Mbizana; the 
people there value collective decision-making.    
iv.) The local community‟s control over communal land and their livelihood strategies 
is undermined by local or global economic forces, which are unfettered by social 
                                                 
13
 Similar patterns also emerge in the resistance to the Mbizana Sugar Project and Gum Tree 
Rebellion, but they are not discussed here. 
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obligation. The Mpondo revolts can be viewed as rural people defending their land 
and customary livelihood strategies. The ACC has mobilised social capital to 
protest the violation of their communal land rights and the undermining of the 
locals‟ livelihood strategies. 
v.) Years of low level resistance lead to threats of war. The Kongo social movement 
(or „iKongo‟), which is said to have played a vital role in the build-up to the 
Mpondo Revolt of 1959-1960, was „born in resistance to the “rehabilitation 
scheme”, [and] tempered in the fight against small allotments and cattle-culling [;] 
it led to the fight against Bantu Authorities and called for armed insurrection‟ 
(Hirson, 1977: 128). Though resistance to the mining venture has been mostly non-
violent, for example, mass meetings and marches, legal submissions, and media 
publicity, recently there has been talk of „war‟. 
vi.) Stories of the Mpondo Revolt of 1959-1960 are part of the contemporary discourse 
of resistance and public protest. Mbizana protesters explicitly link the current 
protest to the Mpondo Revolt of 1959-1960. Veterans of the Mpondo Revolts rally 
young activists with stories of the past. Interviews with the leaders of the ACC, and 
with the veteran Tat‟ uSamson Gampe, reveal that narratives around questions of 
development, decision-making and communal land use, are etched in popular 
memory.  
“We never consented to the Betterment schemes on our land and now 
they want to bring the mining in the same way. …I am prepared to die 
for my forefathers‟ land.” (Tat‟ uSamson Gampe, 2009)  
These stories shape their collective identity and sense of agency, in that the village 
community has never seen itself as a victim, nor have individual residents. They 
still exercise a measure of control over their situation, and, as a collective take 
responsibility for their own well-being. This is evident in their understanding of 
people-centred development, the formation of the ACC and the petitions and 
protests, their championing community-based eco-tourism and the partnership with 
NGOs and legal experts. Following the example of their forebears, today‟s activists 
choose to defend their right to shape their own lives in accordance with goals 
derived from endogenous, collective values.  
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8. CONCLUDING REMARKS  
Present and past resistance in Mbizana is informed by four interlinked issues: the lack of 
consultation about development strategies, the violation of communal land rights, threats to 
livelihood strategies, and the lack of legitimacy of those who ostensibly represent the 
community.  This paper shows that from the Mpondo Revolt in 1959-1960 until the current 
resistance to the mining of communal land, ordinary rural people have organised to defend 
their understanding of participatory decision-making in the context of development. In the 
words of the ACC leadership: “real development must go together with that which 
ordinary people say they want …[it] starts at the feet and progresses upwards”.  References 
to major protests of the past locate the present struggle to retain the right to decide how 
best to develop their land, as part of a history of resistance that started under Apartheid, 
and has continued into the new democratic dispensation. At the heart of their activism is a 
collective consciousness that is best conceptualised as collective agency.  
 
Bongani Bingwa, the narrator in the 2008 Carte Blanche TV documentary, has said:  
“The people of this stretch of the Wild Coast may not have much, but they do 
have their land. A huge part of the opposition to the mining project is that it will 
dispossess them of their birthright, and they are intimately connected to this 
land.”  
He could have added that they have proudly carried on a tradition of collective agency. It is 
this sense of collective agency that  seems to give generations of Mpondo people in 
Mbizana the confidence to resist any form of  „development‟, which ignores endogenous, 
people-centred processes, whether it comes from powerful government officials, 
paternalistic development planners, or greedy businesspeople.  
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